Tom's Bookmarks
Bookmarks tagged gaming
"The game engine for high-performance cross-platform games"
"Defold is a completely free to use game engine for development of desktop, mobile and web games."
"Defold is a completely free to use game engine for development of desktop, mobile and web games."
"2004 action-adventure game based on the film of the same name. Players take the roles of Violet, Klaus, and Sunny Baudelaire, solving puzzles, fighting villains and finding objects. Players encounter characters such as Mr. Poe, Uncle Monty, and Aunt Josephine, along with villains such as Count Olaf, the Hook-Handed Man, the White-Faced Women, and the Bald Man with the Long Nose. "
A self hostable game server that can connect to others instances using the ActivityPub federation protocol and offers a client API to play a city building and resource trading game.
This project is still in early stages of development.
This project is still in early stages of development.
Using built in microphones (which capture electromagnetic leakage) to cheat at games over discord (and other voice platforms)
"We show that built-in sensors in commodity PCs, such as
microphones, inadvertently capture electromagnetic side-
channel leakage from ongoing computation. Moreover, this
information is often conveyed by supposedly-benign chan-
nels such as audio recordings and common Voice-over-IP
applications, even after lossy compression.
Thus, we show, it is possible to conduct physical side-
channel attacks on computation by remote and purely passive
analysis of commonly-shared channels. These attacks require
neither physical proximity (which could be mitigated by dis-
tance and shielding), nor the ability to run code on the target
or configure its hardware. Consequently, we argue, physical
side channels on PCs can no longer be excluded from remote-
attack threat models.
We analyze the computation-dependent leakage captured
by internal microphones, and empirically demonstrate its effi-
cacy for attacks. In one scenario, an attacker steals the secret
ECDSA signing keys of the counterparty in a voice call. In
another, the attacker detects what web page their counterparty
is loading. In the third scenario, a player in the Counter-Strike
online multiplayer game can detect a hidden opponent waiting
in ambush, by analyzing how the 3D rendering done by the
opponent’s computer induces faint but detectable signals into
the opponent’s audio feed."
"We show that built-in sensors in commodity PCs, such as
microphones, inadvertently capture electromagnetic side-
channel leakage from ongoing computation. Moreover, this
information is often conveyed by supposedly-benign chan-
nels such as audio recordings and common Voice-over-IP
applications, even after lossy compression.
Thus, we show, it is possible to conduct physical side-
channel attacks on computation by remote and purely passive
analysis of commonly-shared channels. These attacks require
neither physical proximity (which could be mitigated by dis-
tance and shielding), nor the ability to run code on the target
or configure its hardware. Consequently, we argue, physical
side channels on PCs can no longer be excluded from remote-
attack threat models.
We analyze the computation-dependent leakage captured
by internal microphones, and empirically demonstrate its effi-
cacy for attacks. In one scenario, an attacker steals the secret
ECDSA signing keys of the counterparty in a voice call. In
another, the attacker detects what web page their counterparty
is loading. In the third scenario, a player in the Counter-Strike
online multiplayer game can detect a hidden opponent waiting
in ambush, by analyzing how the 3D rendering done by the
opponent’s computer induces faint but detectable signals into
the opponent’s audio feed."